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This article is based on the speculative hypothesis that the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) as well as the Republic of Ireland (“Ireland”) will eventually implement 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
1980 (“CISG 1980”) into their legal systems.   
Out of the 25 member states of the European Union1 only 5 have yet to 
accede to the CISG 1980: Cyprus, the Republic of Ireland, Malta, Portugal and 
the United Kingdom; all of them are by and large common law systems with the 
exception of Portugal.  However, the article will focus on the British and Irish 
“non-compliance” with the CISG 1980 and the potential modifications that their 
trade law systems would have to face to come up to terms with a potential 
implementation of the CISG 1980. 
The analysis is by way of a comparison between the current common trade 
laws of England and Ireland with the CISG 1980 (and to a certain extent with the 
CISG compliant nations).2  This is followed by an analysis as to why the 
implementation of the CISG 1980 will amount to a legal anacatataxis3 rather than 
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1 On the basis that all 10 candidate states will join the European Union by May 2004. 
2 There are now 62 contracting states to the CISG from all regions of the world.  These 
also include significant non-European trade partners of the UK and the Ireland such as 
the USA, Canada and Australia. 
3 Whole reshuffling or restructuring. 
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A PLETHORA OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMON TRADE 
LAW AND THE CISG 1980: A PLETHORA OF COMPARISONS  
 
Make no mistake, the CISG 1980 and the common law rules of the respective 
trade laws of England and Ireland are worlds apart.  The legal comparatist 
identifies approximately ten grounds of comparison4 between the CISG 1980 and 
Anglo-Irish commercial law (“common law”).  On the face of it, the differences 
appear insurmountable.  However, it will be suggested herein that even if this is 
so, the Anglo-Irish legal system could embrace the notions and mechanics of the 
Convention. 
 
(a) The concept of “good faith” under CISG 1980 
 
The first major difference relates to the concept of “good faith” recognised 
under Article 7 (1) CISG 1980.  It is questionable as to what extent the notion of 
good faith applies in international sale of goods under the Convention.  A 
significant point to note is that the US legal system has generally accepted this 
notion in the formation of international contracts for the sales of goods bringing 
the CISG into force since 1988.5   
On the other hand and on a macro-comparative basis, one notes the rather 
explicit absence of “good faith” between traders in Anglo-Irish law, with the 
exception of consumer contracts due to the influence of European Union Law 
(“EU Law”).6  The case remains, however, that English Law does not generally 
recognise good faith in commercial contracts at the stage of performance and 
enforceability of the contracts.  In Re Moore & Co v Landauer & Co the plaintiff 
agreed to sell to the defendant canned fruit in cases of thirty.7  However, upon 
delivery the fruit was packed in cases of twenty-four.  It was held that the buyer 
was entitled to reject the goods since the description of the goods had not been 
complied with.  This case illustrates that “good faith” may not intervene to the 
 
4 Although comparative law is mainly engaged with comparisons of differences, it could 
be used to highlight similarities too.  Thus, a ground of comparison may well be either a 
difference or a similarity; though as it is apparent, it is differences mainly that one meets 
in a comparison of the CISG 1980 and Anglo-Irish trade law. 
5 The United States of America signed the CISG on the 31of August 1981, ratified it on 
the 11of December 1986 and brought into effect on the 1 of January 1988. 
6 Prior to Council Directive 93/13/EEC there was an almost complete absence of good 
faith in consumer contracts of sale in the UK and the Ireland.  A good analysis on the 
impact of this directive remains the text of Professor Hugh Collins.  See Hugh Collins, 
“Good Faith in European Contract Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1994).  The 
latter text remains the most authoritative text on the effect of good faith in European Law 
in general and the British law of consumer contracts in particular. 
7  [1921] 2 KB 519. 
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rescue of the plaintiff seller, if he has failed to comply either with the description 
or the packaging of the goods in question.  This case remains a good example of 
the very limited application of the concept of “good faith” in common law. In 
Arcos v Ronaasen8 the buyers were entitled to repudiate the contract for mere 
breach of condition, but really in order to take advantage of the falling market 
price of timber.  This was allowed by way of the court’s construction.  The 
position in Irish law is analogous.  The position of the American trade law9 is 
closer to the CISG 1980 model. 
 
(b) Conformity of goods 
 
The second major difference between the trade laws of England and Ireland 
and the CISG 1980 relates to the conformity of the goods of the contract in 
question.  In particular, misrepresentation under Article 25 CISG 1980 occurs 
only if the breach has been “fundamental”. A fundamental breach occurs when 
the party in breach has caused detriment to the innocent party and the party in 
breach did not foresee this.10  It is generally accepted that common law courts are 
far more generous than the CISG 1980 on misrepresentation, whilst rescission is 
not allowed, if the goods have been accepted as in Leaf v International 
Galleries.11 Additionally, when it comes to conformity of goods, the meaning of 
the word “particular” presents difficulties between the common law and the 
CISG 1980; thus, under Article 35 (2) (b) CISG 1980 fit for any “particular 
purpose” has been taken to mean a “special purpose”, whilst under Preist v Last12 
 
8 [1933] AC 470. 
9 For this a mere reference to article 2-103 (1) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code 1952 
(as amended) should suffice.  Article 2-103 (1) (b) (May 1, 1998, Draft) defines good 
faith as follows: "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 
10 In order for the buyer to claim this, he must make a declaration of avoidance by notice 
to the party in breach as in article 26 CISG 1980.  If this succeeds then “avoidance” under 
article 49 CISG 1980 is the case.  The seller too, if he is the innocent party can claim 
avoidance under article 64 CISG 1980.  Obviously the provisions on damages (articles 
74-77 CISG) may also be triggered. 
11 [1950] 2 KB 86.  The main issue was that of a mistake discovered after many years by 
the plaintiff in relation to a sale of painting; it was said inter alia that an action could not 
have been based on mistake, since there was no error in what was handed over.  The 
picture sold was a specific one.  The parties were agreed in the same terms on the same 
subject matter and that has been sufficient to make a contract.  Acceptance of the specific 
good in question had already occurred. 
12 [1903] 2 KB 148. 
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“particular purpose” has to be taken to mean a “commonplace purpose”.13 
Furthermore, a point to be made is that Article 35 CISG does not make allowance 
for automatic rejection of the goods.  Common law takes a significantly different 
approach on this and therefore in Arcos v Ronaasen14 it was held inter alia that 
the description of the goods amounts to a condition.  A breach of condition such 
as misrepresentation for instance is accordingly a genuine basis for rejection 
rights to arise in common law.  Further, whilst under article 38 CISG 1980 there 
is an obligatory duty to examine the goods upon delivery, it would seem that no 
such duty exists under common law (unless it is expressly prescribed in the terms 
of the contract).  Consequently, if common law per se does not recognise any 
such duty, the inspection of the goods by the purchaser must be seen at best as a 
right of the latter only rather than a duty as in the CISG 1980. 
 
(c) Anticipatory breach 
 
Thirdly, the attitudes of the CISG 1980 and common law towards the notion 
of anticipatory breach vary.  Thus, under article 71 (1) CISG 1980 “a party may 
suspend the performance of his obligations if, after to the conclusion of the 
contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial 
part of his obligations…”15  As the notice requirement is very usual in the CISG 
1980, the party intending to suspend performance after the conclusion of the 
contract must give reasonable notice to the other party.16  Accordingly, even 
though the notion of anticipatory breach is recognised to a certain extent in 
common law, it does not successfully tackle cases in a systematic and organised 
manner of the CISG.17  This is surely due to the fact that suspension or 
anticipatory breach is seen not as a matter of course but rather as a matter of 
 
13 See Michael Bridge The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, (Oxford  OUP 
1999) at p 80 (para. 3.14).  Additionally, the statutory expression of Preist v Last can be 
found in s 14 (1) of the British Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) [hereinafter 
SOGSA 1979] and s 10 of the Irish Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980 (old 
s.14 (1) SOGSA 1893) [hereinafter SOGSASOSA 1980]. 
14 [1933] AC 470. 
15 That is if the party in that cannot perform (a) is seriously deficient in his ability to 
perform or non-creditworthy; or (b) his conduct in preparing to perform or in performing 
the contract is makes it apparent that he will not perform a substantial part of his 
obligations as in Article 71 (1) (a) and (b). 
16 As in article 72 (2) CISG. 
17 See Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation v Citati [1957] 2 QB 401.  The case 
provides us with the criteria for anticipatory breach to arise in English law; these were 
stated by Devlin J. 
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exception in common law.18  Bearing this in mind, it would seem that the 
traditional perception of common law does not give formal recognition to 
anticipatory breach per se and that is why the approach of the CISG 1980 
towards anticipatory breach is seen as a major point of departure from common 





Fourthly, the CISG 1980 treats avoidance or termination of the contracts very 
differently from common law. 21  As already noted the CISG 1980 requires a 
“fundamental breach” for the termination of the contract to take effect.  
Nevertheless, it is particularly onerous for the innocent party to prove this or 
rather to override the requirements for this.22  One has to override the relevant 
legal requirements of Article 25 CISG 1980 and then serve notice of this to the 
party in fundamental breach under Article 26.  This is the only way that an 
innocent party can successfully disengage himself from his obligations under the 
CISG 1980 for termination of contract to arise.  This attitude, however, would 
characterise the CISG 1980 as a “pro-contractual” legal instrument, for the CISG 
1980 takes such a stance that the contracts are to be upheld, unless things “go 
terribly wrong” as in the case of fundamental breach.  Common law, on the other, 
takes a significantly stricter stance on this; it seems to be “less pro-contractual”.  
For instance, in the case of a common law contract the test is whether the term 
breached is a condition, even if the breach is only minor.23  And this for good 
reason, namely, legal certainty.  Even if common law contracts such as the ones 
 
18 Suspension in common law arises only in the rather rare instances where the buyer’s 
duty to make payment is not essential, whilst the seller’s concurrent duty to make 
delivery is.  In this case, the seller declines to perform so long as the buyer fails to do so.   
See Total Gas Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 209 (HL).    
19 See Michael Bridge The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, OUP, 1999 at 
p 89 (para 3.29). 
20 See s 28 of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and s 28 of the Irish SOGSA 1893 
(as amended). 
21 Avoidance is the term that the CISG uses of what one would refer to for termination of 
contract in common law.  The common law terminology refers to termination of contract 
as rescission of contract also. 
22 See above on the analysis on the paragraph in relation to conformity of the goods. 
23 As in Arcos Ltd v Ronaasen [1933] AC 470.  In British Law this is subject to s 15A 
SOGSA 1979 (as amended), which stipulates that “where the breach is so slight that it 
would be unreasonable for him (the buyer) to reject the goods, then the breach is not to be 
treated as a breach of condition, but may be treated as a breach of condition. 
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on fob24 and cif25 terms require utmost strictness in their performance, this is 
mainly done for the pursuit of certainty.  Moreover, no onerous requirement of 
notice is required when the contract is terminated.  Thus the buyer - in the case of 
common law contracts of an international sale - will be entitled to terminate 
where the goods are shipped in time, that is outside the shipment period, as in 
Bowes v Shand,26 where it was held that “time is of the essence”.  Peculiarly, 
what the CISG 1980 calls a fundamental breach is also found in another form in 
common law, on what the common lawyer would refer to it as a breach of 
intermediate (aka innominate) term as in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd,27 where it was said that the contract is discharged, if 
the other party’s breach of an intermediate term deprives the innocent party of 
“substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the contract that he should obtain as the consideration for 
performing these undertakings.”28  Another option for a termination of contract 
to arise in common law is where the seller refuses to perform or is not in position 
to fulfil his obligations.  Alternatively, one could add that a contract is simply 
terminated where the buyer may reject the goods.  In either case the innocent 
party may be entitled to damages.  To sum up, termination under the CISG 1980 
is the case where fundamental breach arises, whilst termination of contract in 
common law is the case when a breach of term or intermediate term has arisen.  
Article 35 CISG 1980, on the other hand, does not allow the buyer to reject the 
goods or documents unless the breach has been fundamental, except perhaps in 
the case where such a buyer is entitled to anticipatory breach.   In common law, 
however, the parties are free to withdraw unilaterally from their obligations to 
each other, with damages to arise in favour of the innocent party. 
In relation to termination of contract, an “invention” of German inspiration is 
found in the CISG 1980, an invention that is not found in common law, unless of 
course the contracting parties expressly incorporate this in a contract under the 
common law; this German device is the so-called Nachfrist.  Even though the 
CISG 1980 does not use the German term for obvious reasons, it has dramatically 
 
24 Fob is the abbreviated form of a “free on board” contract for the international sale of 
goods.  In a contract as such it is the seller that pays the shipping costs (and usually the 
insurance costs) from the point of manufacture to a specified destination, at which point 
the buyer assumes responsibility. 
25 Cif is the abbreviated form of a “cost, insurance and freight” contract for the 
international sale of goods.  All these costs (cost, insurance, freight) are normally paid by 
the seller and are included in the price of the contract.  In a contract as such the seller 
owns the goods until they are loaded on vessel.  From that point of time the seller does 
not normally hold any further responsibility in relation to the goods. 
26 (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455. 
27 [1962] 2 Q.B. 26 at 66, per Lord Diplock L J. 
28 That is the innocent party. 
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introduced the notion into its articles.29  In articles 47 (1) and 63 (1) CISG 1980 
its application becomes apparent.  The problem of late delivery may be 
successfully circumvented without the need for the whole contract to collapse as 
is the case in common law.  Nachfrist provides some additional period for 
performance to the party in default, where the defaulting party has served notice 
of the default to the innocent party.  In practical terms this means that the seller 
that has delayed delivery of goods or the buyer that has failed to pay the price 
may take advantage of some additional period that must be notified to the 
innocent party.  The contract cannot be avoided in this case, though the innocent 
party is not deprived of his right to claim damages for delay in performance as 
Articles 47 (2) and 63 (2) CISG 1980 provide.  Obviously, since time is of the 
essence in common law, the perception of the matter for the common lawyer is 
significantly different.30  It would seem that where Nachfrist is almost essential 
for the CISG lawyer by reason of preservation of the contractus,31 the denial of 
Nachfrist by the common lawyer32 is the case by reason that time is of the 
essence.  In CISG contracts it would seem that they have to be upheld by reason 
of Nachfrist, whilst in common law, international contracts will only be upheld 
when they are respectful of the significance of the most important commodity in 
the international commodities markets: time.  
 
(e) Cure of contractual defects 
 
The fifth major incompatibility between the CISG 1980 and Anglo-Irish 
common law treat cure of contractual defects differently.  Thus, the CISG 1980 
recognises the cure of both documents and goods, whilst common law allows at 
most cure of documents, only where time allows.33  Under the CISG 1980 the 
seller may cure performance under articles 37 and 48.  What would be simply 
intolerable in common law, would be the fact that the seller cannot cure any 
defect in the goods and/or the documents after delivery has taken place, for time 
has to be taken to be a condition.  Remarkably, under Article 48 CISG the seller 
may cure even after delivery has taken place.34  What is the legal result, however, 
 
29 In the English text of the Convention the term is translated as “additional period of 
time for performance of obligations.” 
30 Bowes v Shand (1877) 2 App  Cas 455. 
31 Latin for contract or agreement. 
32 By “common lawyer” here British and Irish lawyers are meant.  However, that is not to 
say that American lawyers are not common lawyers.  The main difference of the latter, 
however, with the lawyers in the UK and Ireland is that when it comes to international 
trade law, the American legal system has embraced the CISG 1980, whilst the Anglo-
Irish legal system has not. 
33 Supra 30. 
34 That is remarkably from the British and Irish common lawyer’s point of view. 
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if the seller insists on repair rather than substitution of the goods?  Professor 
Bridge suggests that under Article 46 (2) CISG 1980 the buyer can require the 
substitution of the goods, only in the case that the breach on the part of the seller 
has been fundamental.  Otherwise than that, one has to construe a pro-seller 
stance by way of application of the good faith notion under article 7 (1) of the 
CISG 1980 and indeed one wonders why that should be the case from the 
common law point of view.  It should be noted that in this latter case, if the 
breach is not fundamental, it is the seller who chooses either to repair faulty 
goods or to substitute them.35  Moreover, another complication as far as a 
common lawyer is concerned, is what would happen if the buyer avoids the 
contract by reason of fundamental breach under article 49 CISG 1980, before the 
seller serves a notice of attempt to cure a defect?  Whilst logic would suggest that 
the buyer is perfectly able to do so, the CISG 1980 does not seem to follow the 
path of logic.  Consequently, since one has to take into account that the CISG 
1980 exists to uphold international contracts, a willing seller that serves notice of 
cure after the notice of termination on the part of the buyer may still be able to 
replace the goods in question and prima facie preserve the contractual 
arrangement.  This is for two reasons: firstly the CISG must be interpreted in the 
light of good faith and secondly, as Honnold suggests, one has to weigh up the 
fundamental breach in the light of the declared or possible willingness of the 
seller to cure.36  At common law, apart of course from the fact that there is no 
such requirement of notice for an additional time fixed for the performance of 
obligations, there is no such onerous requirement as a notice to cure, unless the 
parties have agreed prior to the conclusion of their contract of sale. 
 
(f) Buyer’s right to reject 
 
The sixth incompatibility between Anglo-Irish trade law on the one hand and 
the CISG 1980 on the other is the fact that a buyer in an international contract of 
sale under the CISG 1980 would exercise his rejection rights in a substantially 
different way from the common law version of international sales.  Simply put 
the CISG 1980 does not per se recognise the “inconsistent act doctrine”, since the 
buyer may unilaterally sell the goods in question without any negative legal 
consequences. The Convention, therefore, allows restitution notwithstanding 
resale, consumption or transformation of the goods by virtue of article 82 (2) 
CISG 1980, that provides for a right as such.  This latter provision must be one of 
the most diametrically opposed provisions of the CISG 1980 towards common 
 
35 See Michael Bridge The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, OUP, 1999 at 
p 93 (para 3.34). 
36 JO Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention, Kluwer, 2nd Edition, 1991 at p 376.  
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law.  For instance, the English lawyer would have good grounds of principle to 
not even contemplate this; this because he would surmise that under s. 35 (1) (b) 
of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and s. 35 of the Irish SOGSA 1893 (as 
amended)37 a buyer cannot simply reject the goods, if he has received them and 
thereafter “does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the 
ownership of the seller” (inconsistent act doctrine).  Even more peculiarly, a 
buyer under article 82 (2) CISG 1980 must at least make a partial restitution of 
the goods, if it is impossible to make full restitution of the goods.  Whereas under 
s. 35A of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) a buyer may make partial 
restitution only as of right.  The buyer has the right to retain the remaining goods.  
A final difference in relation to the rejection rights is that the CISG 1980 imposes 
a positive obligation on the buyer under article 86 to preserve the goods in 
question, be it at the final expense of the seller.  However, both British and Irish 
law by way of s.36 SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and s.36 SOGSA 1893 (as 
amended), clearly suggest that unless otherwise agreed, the buyer is not bound to 
return the goods in question to the seller.  Consequently, any such buyer would 
have no duty to preserve the goods either, for a buyer that does not have to return 
goods that refused to accept them, cannot be construed as being under an 
obligation to preserve them. 
 
(g) Calculating damages 
 
The seventh great difference between the CISG 1980 and the British SOGSA 
1979 (as amended) and the Irish SOGSA 1893 (as amended by SOGSASOSA 
1980) the differing techniques used to quantify damages technique.  For the 
purpose of this analysis it should suffice to say that the Anglo-Irish method of 
calculating damages is simpler than the action quanti minoris38 of the CISG 
1980, which is a legal device of Roman law origins.  By way of example, let us 
assume that an international contract for the sale of a cargo of maize has been 
concluded.  The contract price for this is £ 100,000.  By the date of delivery the 
goods are and s.53 (5) of the Irish SOGSA 1893 (as amended) the damages that 
the buyer may receive in a falling market, should be calculated as follows: non-
conforming, whilst the market price of maize happens to have fallen to £70,000.  
In perfect condition the cargo maize would have been worth £85,000; since, 
however, some of the maize cargo is non-conforming the maize cargo and the 
 
37 As amended by the SOGSASOSA 1980. 
38 Actio quanti minoris stands for that system of calculation of damages, whereby the 
quantification of damages occurs by way of a reduction in price.  A good analysis on this 
is provided by E. Bergsten and A.Miller “The Remedy of Reduction in Price” (1979) 27 
American Journal of Comparative Law 255. 
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market price thereof has fallen; its value is on delivery only £59,500.  Under s. 53 
(3) of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended)  
 
£70,000 - £59,500 = £ 11,500 (damages owed to the buyer if the 
sale of the contract for the international sales of goods is 
governed either by the laws of the UK or the Ireland). 
 
Under article 50 CISG (action quanti minoris) the damages that the buyer 
may receive in a falling market, should be calculated as follows: 
 
£70,000 - £59,500 = £11,500 (this amounts to 16.42% of the 
market price of £70, 000) 
 
then this relevant ratio (16.42% in our case) is applied to the initial contract price 
(£100,000).  16.42% of £100,000 = £16,420 (damages owed to the buyer if the 
contract for the international sales of goods is governed by the CISG 1980). 
Alternatively, let us assume that the contract price is again £100,000, and that 
by the date of delivery the goods are again non-conforming, whilst the market 
price of maize happens to have increased to £150,000.  In perfect condition the 
cargo maize would have been worth £120,000; since, however, some of the 
maize cargo is not conforming the maize cargo and the market price thereof has 
fallen, its value is only £85,000 upon delivery.  Under s. 53 (3) of the British 
SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and s. 53 (5) of the Irish SOGSA 1893 (as amended) 
the damages that the buyer may receive in a falling market, should be calculated 
as follows: 
 
£150,000 - 120,000 = £30,000 (damages owed to the buyer if the 
sale of the contract for the international sales of goods is 
governed either by the laws of England or the Ireland). 
 
Under article 50 CISG (action quanti minoris) the damages that the buyer 
may receive in a falling market, should be calculated as follows: 
 
£150,000 - £120,000 = £30,000 (this amounts to 20% of the 
market price of £150, 000) 
 
then this relevant ratio (20% in our case) is applied to the initial contract 
price (£100, 000).  20% of £100,000 = £20,000 (damages owed to the buyer if 
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(h) Frustration 
 
The eighth and final difference between the CISG 1980 and common law 
trade rules is that they have a variant approach on frustration of the contract of 
sale.  This time the CISG 1980 clearly departs from the Anglo-Irish law 
perspective rather than the American law view.39  According to Hirji Mulji v 
Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd when a contract becomes frustrated common law 
dictates that this contract be prospectively discharged.40  Bridge suggests that this 
position is a rather inflexible attitude of common law, since this approach simply 
does not address matters such as partial or temporary frustration. 41  Article 79 
CISG 1980 takes a rather closer look to the American legal technique on 
frustration; consequently, this article broadly justifies a party’s impossibility “due 
to an impediment beyond [this party’s] control”.  However, this proviso neither 
stipulates, nor implies that the parties are discharged from their contractual 
obligations.  In effect, if a seller cannot perform due to force majeure for 
instance, the buyer may well find himself paying the price of the goods that he 
may never have been delivered.  However, that is not say that he cannot later 
avoid such a contract. This may be achievable through three different legal paths:  
 
(1) either the buyer holds that the non-performance on the part of the 
seller is a fundamental breach as in Article 25 CISG; or  
(2) he perceives the matter as one of non-performance as in article 72 
CISG and the contract is repudiated; or  
(3) the buyer allows the seller an extension of time to perform his duties 
but the seller has still not performed.  In this latter case the buyer 
can claim restitution of money that he has already paid to the seller 
under article 81 (2) CISG 1980. 
      
AN INSIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SIMILARITIES BETWEEN 
COMMON TRADE LAW AND THE CISG OR CONCESSIONS 
THAT THE CISG MAKES TO COMMON LAW SYSTEMS  
 
(a) Specific performance 
 
Specific performance is recognised in the CISG 1980, though the common 
lawyers of the US, Canada and Australia have always felt that their fora will not 
 
39 See Michael Bridge The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, OUP, 1999 at 
p 106 (para 3.57). 
40 [1926] AC 497. 
41 Supra at n.43. 
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grant it as much as the Continental courts would.  Farnsworth, an American 
academic, referred to specific performance as a remedial provision that is foreign 
to the common law tradition.42   Obviously, he did not mean that an American or 
a Canadian judge may not order the remedy of specific performance in particular, 
though quite rare cases, but rather he meant that the common law judges would 
use it less frequently than the civilian judges would.  Articles 46 and 62 1980 
expressly refer to specific performance though it is article 28 CISG 1980, which 
makes a significant concession to common law judges: 
 
“If…one party is entitled to require performance of any 
obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a 
judgement for specific performance…” 
 
Therefore, it is the forum of the judgement that would most probably signify 
the remedy pursued, not the substantive law of the contract per se.   
 
(b) Mitigation of loss 
 
Another similarity between Anglo-Irish trade law and the CISG 1980 occurs in 
the sphere of mitigation of loss cases.  By and large article 77 CISG 1980 draws 
a parallel line to the attitude of Anglo-Irish trade law, since under this provision 
the plaintiff must (after the defendant’s breach of contract) take all reasonable 
steps to minimise losses due to this breach, in order for the plaintiff to recover 
damages from the defendant.  In accordance with the civilian law tradition, the 
CISG 1980 does not pedantically stipulate the facts of the cases where mitigation 
of loss may occur.  It merely sets out guiding principles.  However, one has to 
take into account the diversity of legal systems that have acceded to the CISG 
1980.  The fora from different countries does not always present identical legal 
results when the mitigation of loss doctrine is applied.       
 
THE IMPACT OF THE CISG 1980:  AN ANACATATAXIS 
RATHER THAN A TRIVIAL MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION 
DUE TO THE PLETHORA OF DIFFERENCES TO BE 
OVERRIDDEN  
 
To draw an analogy, the implementation of the CISG 1980 in Anglo-Irish 
law would be as decisive as the full implementation of the European Convention 
 
42 E Allan Farnsworth Discussion, in A E von Overbeck présidence, Wiener 
Übereinkommen von 1980, Colloquium Lausanne 19/20 November 184, (Zürich: 
Schulthess 1985) p 105. 
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on Human Rights 1950 (“ECHR”) by the UK Human Rights Act 1998.  The 
differences between the CISG 1980 and ECHR are obvious: the former is an 
international instrument of law, whilst the latter is a regional instrument of law; 
secondly, the former will alter the way by which a national legal system (the 
United Kingdom and/or Ireland) will “see itself” towards other legal systems in 
the formation of international contracts, whilst the latter has altered the way by 
which the British legal system “sees itself” towards its own nationals in the 
pursuit of civil liberties justice.  Thirdly, whilst the ECHR brought a cataclysmic 
change in the sphere of public law in the UK, the CISG 1980 has the potential to 
bring an equivalent legal anacatataxis in the sphere of British and Irish private 
law. 
The CISG 1980 has never been welcomed in the U.K. and Ireland.  Despite 
the fact that most of the developed world has willingly embraced the CISG 1980, 
including the great trading powers such as the USA, Australia, Canada, 
Germany, France, the Russian Federation and China, the voices for the 
preservation of the current status quo of trade law in the UK and Ireland well 
exceed those in favour of the adoption of the CISG 1980.  At the preface to 
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, Professor Guest has made his case for the non-
adoption of the CISG 1980 quite clear: 
 
“…the Convention is not well adapted to sales on cif, fob and 
other terms common in overseas sales, and its often vague or 
open-textured terminology would, if it were to displace the 
present relatively settled English judge-made rules governing 
contracts on such terms, be a source of considerable (and 
regrettable) uncertainty.”43
 
On the other hand, one should refer to Farnsworth, an American scholar, to 
understand the fears of the common lawyers, when the CISG 1980 would have to 
be implemented in the UK and Ireland.  Farnsworth, commenting on the remedial 
provisions of the CISG 1980 that were in principle “foreign” to US law, once 
said quite colourfully: 
 
“Fundamental breach -- OK, but strange; Nachfrist – We don’t 
understand it, we never heard of it, but we like it; Price 
reduction44 -- We don’t understand it, and we don’t like it; 
 
43 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th Edition), at [ix] [Hereinafter 
Benjamin]. 
44 Farnsworth refers here to what the civilian lawyers would most probably know and 
refer to as action quanti minoris. 
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Specific Performance – We hope your courts45 will not resort to 
it as much as the may.”46
 
The most dismissive view on the adoption of the CISG 1980, however, has 
come from Professor Treitel: 
 
“…the Convention…does not specifically deal with standard 
types of overseas sales (such as cif or fob contracts) while at the 
same time [it lays] down general rules which if applied to such 
contracts, would produce one of two effects.  They would either 
produce results significantly different from those produced by 
the present English rules governing such sales, or (because of the 
lack of precision with which the Convention is drafted) cause 
considerable uncertainty in areas in which the present rules of 
English law lead to clear and easily predictable results.”47
 
However, there have been also voices in favour of the adoption of the CISG 
1980 mainly for reasons of practicability and world uniformity in the area of the 
international sales of goods; the leading scholars on this have been Professors 
Reynolds and Nicholas.  Nicholas represented the UK in the drafting of the 
Convention.  After many years, he commented that the reception by legal and 
commercial circles in the UK was at best mixed.48  Reynolds too has been of the 
opinion as one of the editors of Benjamin that the UK should adopt the CISG “as 
soon as possible”.49
In clearly practical matters of implementation, both the UK and Ireland 
would not have to be concerned with whether the CISG 1980 would override the 
current status quo of their international trade rules.  This should be the case for a 
good reason: under article 6 CISG 1980 the contracting parties from different 
states may well exclude the application of the CISG or derogate or vary its 
 
45 That is the civilian courts when applying the CISG. 
46 Supra at n 46. 
47 Benjamin at 18-004.  
48 Nicholas B, “The United Kingdom and the Vienna Sales Convention: Another Case of 
Splendid Isolation” (March 1993) Centro di Studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e 
straniero diretto da MJ Bonell. 
49 Professor Reynolds expressed this view in “A Note of Caution” in The Frontiers of 
Liability, Vol 2, (P Birks ed, OUP, 1994).  Reynolds signified a number of concerns 
about certain aspects of the Convention, however, his final point of view was that the UK 
should ratify the Convention. 
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effect.50  In effect, article 6 CISG 1980 empowers the parties to use the CISG 
1980 à la carte.  Even more importantly, the Convention makes allowance for 
considerable derogations, since for instance the contracting states may exclude 
considerable parts of it such as Part II (formation of an international contract of 
sale) or Part III (substantive rules) of the Convention as in Article 92 (1) CISG 
1980. 
However, if the UK and Ireland were ever to attempt to implement the “full-
package” of the CISG 1980 then this would amount to a clear legal anacatataxis, 
for the international trade lawyers of these two countries would have to think of 
international contracts for the sale of goods in a fundamentally different way than 
at present, that is in CISG 1980 terms. Further, there are additional reasons for 
such a legal anacatataxis. 
First of all, the fact that there is such reluctance to ratify the Convention 
should be a reason that proves the point of anacatataxis.  International trade law 
in the UK and Ireland would never be the same.  Furthermore, if the trade law of 
a country is divided into three: domestic trade transactions rules; domestic trade 
transactions vis-à-vis consumers rules and international trade transactions rules, 
then it would not be an exaggeration to say that good faith is now fully 
introduced in the Anglo-Irish legal system in trade transactions vis-à-vis 
consumers.  Thus, even if pure common law is abortive of notions of good faith, 
it would seem that the reluctance of the Anglo-Irish legal system to the notion of 
good faith is clearly on the retreat in relation to consumer contracts post Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC. In connection with this and for the purposes of the CISG 
1980 implementation to the international trade law branch of the Anglo-Irish 
legal system it would be essential that a limited notion of good faith be 
introduced.  This, of course, would have to be the case only where a trader from 
the UK for instance would accept the effect of the CISG for a contract for the 
sale of goods with an overseas trader, e.g. one from France.  Additionally, it 
would not be necessary for the two legal systems that would ratify the CISG 
1980 to alter the domestic character of their trade laws; this would mean that it 
would be “business as usual” for trade transactions within the UK and Ireland.  
Therefore, if the traders, academics51 and judges52 from the UK and Ireland do 
 
50 Article 6 CISG 1980 stipulates as follows: “The parties may exclude the application of 
this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its 
provisions.”  
51 Professor Bridge in “Does Anglo-Canadian Law Need A Doctrine of Good Faith?”, 
Canadian Business Law Journal (1984) referred to the American legal system, which has 
recognised the notion of good faith to the performance and enforcement of the trade 
transaction as in Article 2-205 Uniform Commercial Code.  Still he underlined that it 
would be “an abuse of the comparative method”, if a principle of good faith would be 
introduced in the English and the Canadian legal system.  Teubner too in “Legal Irritants: 
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not want by reason of legal certainty the concept of good faith to be introduced in 
their domestic trade transactions within their legal systems, this should be 
respected.  However, even this last point is arguable by operation of ss. 15A and 
30 (2A) of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) which deal with the notion of 
“unreasonableness”. One would be able to present this as the closest statutory 
approach of British trade law to a creeping form of good faith in the international 
trade laws of the UK.  Unreasonableness could be the Trojan horse of good faith, 
in order for the latter to enter the international trade law branch of the British and 
Irish legal systems.  Accordingly, article 7 (1) could be accepted by the common 
lawyers in Ireland and the UK.  In any such case the creeping character of good 
faith as in the form of unreasonableness, would become a clearcut introduction of 
good faith, be it in the international branches of the trade laws of the UK and 
Ireland.  This too should arguably amount to an anacatataxis.   
 
(a) Breach of term of conformity of goods 
 
Another point relating to the potential implementation of CISG 1980 is 
breach of the term of conformity of goods.  Since the meaning of “particular 
purpose” would have to be aligned with that of the CISG 1980, then the 
interpretation of the common law would be confined to trade transactions either 
within the respective legal systems or where the parties have so agreed in 
international contracts.   The domestic interpretation of “particular purpose” 
could still remain as it is in Preist v Last.53  Once again the new meaning would 
be applied on a “voluntary” basis to international contracts, whilst the traditional 
interpretation of the common law would at least operate within the domestic 
trade transactions of the UK and the Irish legal system. 54
 
(b) Anticipatory breach 
 
A further reason why the CISG 1980 would result in a legal anacatataxis is 
that it would bring a substantially different approach on the question of 
anticipatory breach, which would have to be fully recognised.  The partial 
 
Good Faith in British Law”, Modern Law Review (1998) has recently expressed his 
objections on the full introduction of good faith in British law.  His conclusion has been 
that such an introduction would cause many problems.  
52 For instance, in Walform v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 at 138 Lord Ackner has famously 
said that: “…the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant…[and] unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position 
of a negotiating party.” 
53 [1903] 2 KB 148. 
54 That is when the parties have so intended. 
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recognition of the notion in s.28 of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and 
s.28 of the Irish SOGSA 1893 (as amended) should be extended to give full 
recognition to cases of anticipatory breach and in particular to such cases of 
anticipatory breach that are not currently recognised by the above Acts.  The 
Anglo-Irish legislator could either choose to extend the current provisions on 
anticipatory breach of their sale of goods Acts or allow for a parallel system of 
law under a potential CISG Act that would recognise an extended version on 
anticipatory breach for international contracts under the CISG 1980.  
 
(c) Fundamental breach 
 
Moreover, an additional reason for which an anacatataxis would be a strong 
possibility with the implementation of the CISG 1980, would be the fact that 
international trade lawyers from the UK and Ireland would have to come to terms 
with the rather peculiar and onerous notion of “fundamental breach”.  Indeed, 
this would be one of the most difficult occurrences of alignment of any potential 
CISG 1980 implementation in the UK and Ireland.  However, since the CISG 
1980 upholds the notion of the “autonomy of the parties” the parties may well 
exclude its application altogether.  If they include it in the contractual 
arrangement, then the common lawyers of the UK and the Ireland would most 
probably have to consult their counterparts over in the USA, for the USA is the 
best example of a common law system, in which the CISG 1980 has operated 
well.  As already mentioned, “unreasonableness” is the notion that could well be 
the starting point not only for the partial introduction of good faith in the 
international trade law aspects of the common laws of the UK and Ireland but 
also for the comprehension of the notion of fundamental breach in the CISG 
1980.  This would be particularly helpful, since common lawyers would see the 
rationale behind the existence of this notion in the CISG 1980 and this would 
most importantly help their understanding on practical matters too, when they 
would have to comprehend and tackle cases on good faith matters in every day 
practice.  In conjunction with fundamental breach, common lawyers in the UK 
and Ireland would have to come to terms with the novel legal device of 
Nachfrist,55 a mechanism that -if properly utilised- may give a new lease of life 
to the international transaction in question.  In any case, it would be more than 
helpful for common lawyers in these countries to have a closer look at how their 
counterparts in other common law jurisdictions that have ratified the Convention 
and accepted this notion such as the USA, Canada and Australia.  Additionally, it 
would also be advisable that the German commercial law be looked at from 
British and Irish business lawyers, for them to have information from the very 
 
55 That is novel for the CISG itself but not so novel for the German trade law system, 
from which it derives. 
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“birthplace” of the notion, since Nachfrist remains undeniably a German legal 
“invention”.  
 
(d) Cure of defective goods and documents 
 
As regards cure of defective goods and documents, the CISG 1980 is clearly 
more “pro-contractual” than the common law rules, as this has already been 
suggested above.  This per se should amount to an anacatataxis, if the CISG 
1980 would be ever introduced in the UK and Ireland.  Common law, on the 
other hand, remains strict to the extreme in relation to the legal results expected 
and in this way the contractus56 under it remains ascertained to the extreme too.  
Common law is, therefore, a rather more predictable legal species, when it comes 
to international trade law.  Otherwise, than that, in the case where the CISG 1980 
would be chosen to operate in a international contract, then the traders in Ireland 
and the UK would have to appreciate that the CISG 1980 is more lenient than the 
current common law rules and that it makes considerable allowances for the cure 
of defective goods as well as of documents.  In this case an anacatataxis would 
be a matter of adjustment of legal mentality; that is, common lawyers would find 
themselves in a substantially different environment of legal technique.   Further 
relevant sale of goods acts of both countries in question should perhaps be 
susceptible to slight amendments or rather to provisions that would make it clear 
that in case the CISG 1980 would be adopted for the conclusion of an 
international sale, this would allow the parties to use the full machinery of the 
CISG 1980 (if they so intend) and therefore be able to cure both defective goods 
and documents. 
 
(e) Inconsistent Act doctrine 
 
As regards the inconsistent act doctrine, which is explicitly recognised under 
s. 35 (1) (b) of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and s. 3557 of the Irish 
SOGSA 1893 (as amended), there are three possibilities on how this 
characteristic would have to be “watered down” for the CISG 1980 to be 
successfully implemented.  An anacatataxis in such a case would occur either if 
the national legislators of the UK and Ireland would omit the above sections and 
thus render this doctrine obsolete or even more interestingly if they would allow 
these sections to continue to operate as well as recognising the mechanics of the 
CISG 1980 by statutory amendment on the matter or allow the preservation of 
the above sections but give a sufficient margin of choice to the traders to choose 
the mechanics of their contract by recognising their autonomy to choose the 
 
56 Supra  n 35.  
57 As amended by the SOGSASOSA 1980. 
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appropriate legal environment for their international contracts.  In this latter case 
the national legislator of either country would save himself from legislating anew 
on his Sale of Goods Act,58 whereas it would seem that such a legislator would 
provide a better, less regulated environment for the traders to have the final say 
on the way they wish to conduct their business.  This of course would be a partial 
revival of lex mercatoria in one sense, because it is the traders that should know 
trade best and it is they, who should be able freely to decide the legal tactics of 
conducting it. 
 
(f) Quantification of damages 
 
A similar pattern of law reform could be followed in relation to the 
quantification of damages.  Again there are three paths that could be followed in 
relation s. 53 (3) of the British SOGSA 1979 (as amended) and s.53 (5) of the 
Irish SOGSA 1893; either repeal these clauses altogether, which is not suggested, 
however, since they have served well so far or draw a parallel provision to the 
existing sections or simply incorporate a freedom of choice of law clause in a 
potential CISG Act.  The latter possibility is again seen as the least detrimental to 
the well-functioning of the legal system.  This is so, because even though a legal 
anacatataxis would still be the legal result of such an Act, this would not bring 




On the question of frustration as Professor Bridge suggests59 British law and 
most probably Irish law too would necessitate changes to face questions of partial 
or temporary frustration.  This would have to be the case whether or not the 
CISG 1980 would be implemented.  However, it would be a good starting point 
for the legislator to take into account the CISG 1980 solutions on this as well as 
the American legal techniques on the matter, from which the CISG 1980 is 
 
58 However, one would be able to speculate that the introduction of the CISG 1980 in the 
international subject areas of British and Irish trade laws would be introduced with a new 
piece of legislation in the exoteric form of the Human Rights Act 1998.  This would 
mean that new legislation would be brought about; however, this would take a significant 
amount of time to be fully enforced, since for example the alignment of the whole British 
legislation with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 took a period of two 
years until October 2, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force.  Similarly, the 
partial alignment of British and Irish trade laws with the CISG would take a significant 
amount of time, even if the traders themselves would not be bound to choose any 
particular law by way of autonomy of the parties: that is CISG or non-CISG (fob, cif and 
their variables).    
59  Supra at n 43. 
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largely inspired.  An additional point is that in any case the legislators of the UK 
and Ireland would have to examine carefully the application of the CISG 1980 in 
their “close relative” systems such as the Australian, the Canadian and the 
American one. 
   
CONCLUSIONS  
  
Firstly, the CISG 1980 remains a dynamic international trade law instrument 
with all its drawbacks.60  It should be able to accommodate the peculiar features 
of the British and the Irish legal systems and be accommodated within them.61  
Secondly, these two legal systems have the potential to fully implement the CISG 
1980 without significant practical difficulties as long as very careful statutory 
drafting in relation to the CISG 1980 is carried out.  Thirdly, any such 
implementation would bring a major legal anacatataxis to the current status quo 
of the international branches of the trade laws of the UK and Ireland.  Fourthly, 
the traders themselves would be free to choose between the application of the 
CISG 1980 or the “old traditional” rules of the common law of Ireland and the 
UK.  Whether they would choose the more than a century well established 
precedents on fob and cif contracts or the rather more globalised and 
internationally accepted CISG 1980, the ultimate choice would obviously be 
theirs.   
Whether the CISG 1980 is a lingua franca or merely an Esperanto of 
international trade law, this instrument of law remains the closest solution to a 
common set of principles for a globalised commercial law.  The rather insular 
attitude of the United Kingdom and Ireland to the harmonization phenomenon is 
regrettable, whilst the anacacataxis that these systems should face in a potential 
case of implementation of the CISG 1980 should not be a reason that holds these 
systems back from ratifying the CISG 1980.  
 
60 On a balanced view in relation to the objections to the CISG one should read the article 
by Steyn “A Kind of Esperanto?” in P Birks (ed) The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford OUP, 
1994). 
61 See the Law Commission’s (UK) memorandum submitted to the Department of Trade 
and Industry on 30 October 1989. 
